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Abstract	
I	investigate	the	extent	to	which	there	might	be,	now	or	in	the	future,	non-human	
animals	that	partake	in	the	kind	of	fully	human-style	consciousness	(FHSC)	that	has	
been	taken	by	many	philosophers	to	be	the	basis	of	normative	personhood.	I	first	
sketch	a	conceptual	framework	for	considering	the	question,	based	on	a	range	of	
philosophical	literature	on	relationships	between	consciousness,	language	and	
personhood.	I	then	review	the	standard	basis	for	largely	a	priori	skepticism	about	
the	possibility	that	any	non-human	animal	could	experience	FHSC	and	be	a	person	
to	any	extent,	and	indicate	empirically	motivated	grounds	for	rejecting	such	
skepticism,	at	least	with	respect	to	a	select	group	of	hypersocial	candidate	species	
with	communication	systems	we	do	not	currently	know	are	not	languages:	corvids,	
parrots,	elephants,	and	toothed	whales.	Relevant	facts	about	elephants	are	reviewed	
in	some	detail,	as	a	mini	case	study.	While	it	is	suggested	that	elephants	might	
partake	in	the	sort	of	consciousness	characteristic	of	personhood	to	some	extent,	
grounds	are	given	for	expecting	that	this	extent	is	sharply	limited	by	comparison	
with	normal	humans.	As	these	grounds	are	mainly	aspects	of	elephants’	external	
niche,	however,	rather	than	known	limitations	in	their	inboard	cognitive	or	
representational	capacities,	the	surprising	conclusion	emerges	that	elephants	might	
acquire	FHSC,	and	thereby	become	persons,	if	they	can	be	brought	into	conversation	
with	humans,	a	possibility	opened	by	considerations	canvassed	in	the	paper.	
Keywords:	non-human	personhood;	non-human	consciousness;	non-human	
communication	and	language;	elephant	behaviour;	elephant	minds	
1.	Introduction	
Philosophers	are	participants	in	the	collective	effort	to	scientifically	understand	
consciousness	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	attempts	to	achieve	the	conceptual	
stability	across	research	projects	that	cognitive	science	requires	are	unavoidably	
entangled	with	the	history	of	a	cluster	of	contested	folk	concepts,	including	mind,	
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self,	personhood,	and	consciousness	itself.	Second,	these	concepts	are	intensely	
contested	because	questions	of	deep	normative	significance	are	implicated	in	
debates	about	how	to	limit	or	expand	their	applications.	I	suggest	that	it	fairly	
summarizes	both	folk	practice	and	the	history	of	(at	least	Western)	moral	theory	to	
say	that	an	organism’s	life	and	entitlement	to	protection	from	cruelty	take	on	
increasing	moral	significance	to	the	extent	that	the	organism	in	question	is	deemed	
to	be	conscious,	and	to	manifest	some	of	the	special	properties	of	personhood.	If	
such	portentous	normative	weight	is	entangled	with	empirical	conditions	for	a	
specific	form	of	conscious	self-representation,	then	both	philosophers	and	scientists	
are	essential	parties	to	inquiry	into	the	scope	of	this	cluster	of	concepts.	
A	general	lesson	from	a	century	and	a	half	of	post-Darwinian	biology	and	
behavioural	science	is	that	evolutionary	processes	do	not	build	structures	that	
support	distinctions	with	hard	boundaries	(Dennett	1995).	In	constructing,	under	
empirical	discipline,	concepts	in	the	consciousness-related	cluster,	we	should	
therefore	deliberately	avoid	building	in	impediments	to	recognizing	continuous	
degrees	of	manifestation.	One	strategy	for	remaining	alert	to	this	heuristic	is	
keeping	potential	non-human	comparisons	and	extensions	in	view	as	we	consider	
our	advancing	knowledge	of	human	mental	functioning,	self-awareness,	and	
personhood.	
Of	course	this	methodological	value	is	only	one	of	many	motivations	for	interest	in	
non-human	consciousness.	Organisms	with	minds	evolved	from	mindless	organisms,	
selfhood	evolved	in	structures	that	could	not	initially	support	it,	and	human	persons	
are	descended	with	modification	from	non-humans	and	non-persons.	The	details	of	
these	histories	are	responsible	for	the	characteristics	of	the	consciousness-related	
phenomena	we	seek	to	understand,	and	knowing	how	they	unfolded	is	a	basic	part	
of	the	first-order	knowledge	at	which	the	science	aims.	
The	essay	to	follow	investigates	the	extent	to	which	there	might	be,	now	or	in	the	
future,	instances	of	the	form	of	consciousness	characteristic	of	humans,	and	
supportive	of	the	normative	status	of	personhood,	among	existing	species	of	
animals.	It	is	an	exercise	in	philosophy	because	it	aims	at	clarifying	which	kinds	of	
reasons	are,	in	light	of	the	current	state	of	knowledge,	more	or	less	persuasive	with	
respect	to	taking	this	possibility	seriously.		
After	reviewing	general	considerations,	I	will	focus	on	elephants	as	a	mini	case	
study.	This	is	partly	for	idiosyncratic,	practical	reasons.	Colleagues	and	I	are	in	the	
process	of	designing	and	preparing	field	conditions	for	experiment-based	
estimation	of	structural	models	of	elephants’	risk	preferences.	This	activity	forces	us	
to	attend	to	potential	distinctions	between	measuring	characteristics	of	individual	
elephants’	minds,	and,	because	elephants	are	intensely	socially	interactive	learners,	
probing	characteristics	of	their	group	cultures.	We	are	well	used	to	attending	to	this	
central	distinction	when	we	study	human	responses	to	risk.	But	we	should	not	
expect	to	simply	transfer	over	to	elephants,	in	our	experimental	design,	our	
experientially	refined	assumptions	about	how	it	plays	out	in	people.	Elephants,	most	
will	agree,	are	not	persons	in	the	full-blown	sense	that	normal	humans	are.	But,	I	
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will	also	argue,	they	might	be	or	become	persons	to	a	‘diminished’	extent,	and	this	
matters	to	the	way	in	which	we	should	expect	to	interpret	our	data	on	their	choices.		
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	2	sets	out	the	conceptual	framework	for	
the	discussion.	Given	that	it	consists	of	stipulations	rather	than	arguments,	it	is	
longer	than	such	exercises	typically	require.	However,	none	of	the	core	
consciousness-related	cluster	of	concepts	has	been	regimented	beyond	the	stage	of	
verbal	description,	so	distinctions	must	be	spelled	out	very	explicitly	if	they	are	to	
provide	much	value.	Section	3	reviews	the	standard	basis	for	largely	a	priori	
skepticism	about	the	possibility	that	any	non-human	animal	could	have	the	form	of	
consciousness	that	supports	personhood	to	any	extent,	and	indicates	empirically	
motivated	grounds	for	rejecting	such	skepticism.	Section	4	directly	asks	whether	
elephants	might	have	the	relevant	form	of	consciousness	to	be	persons	to	some	
extent,	and	aims	to	isolate	the	main	basis	for	supposing	that	the	extent	of	their	
possible	personhood	is	sharply	limited	by	comparison	with	that	of	normal	humans.	
However,	Section	5	concludes	by	briefly	motivating	the	surprising	idea	that	
elephants	might	develop	the	relevant	form	of	consciousness	and	become	persons	to	
a	much	greater	extent	if	they	can	be	brought	into	conversation	with	humans,	a	
possibility	opened	by	the	considerations	canvassed	in	the	paper.		
2.	Conceptual	assumptions	
I	begin	by	stipulating	interpretations	of	the	consciousness-related	cluster	of	
concepts.	These	stipulations	are	derived	from	philosophical	literature	to	be	
identified,	but	I	will	not	present	arguments	for	them.	They	are	tools	to	be	used,	and	
eventually	improved	under	the	pressure	of	scientific	experience.	Since	I	take	a	
realist	stance	toward	the	phenomena	that	the	concepts	aim	to	capture,	the	
stipulations	do	amount	to	provisional	ontological	hypotheses.	
Following	Dennett	(1987),	I	assume	that	an	animal	has	a	mind	just	in	case	it	is	
necessary	for	students	of	its	behaviour	to	assume	the	intentional	stance	toward	it	on	
pain	of	being	unable	to	track	some	observable	regularities.	The	reference	to	
necessity	makes	this	a	realist	stipulation;	Dennett’s	(1971)	famous	thermostat	does	
not	have	a	mind	if	taking	the	intentional	stance	with	respect	to	it	is	merely	a	matter	
of	practical	convenience,	but	even	an	unreflective	special-purpose	AI	really	has	a	
mind	if	some	of	its	behaviour	can	only	be	reliably	predicted	from	the	intentional	
stance	(Ross	2000).1	It	is	a	plausible	conjecture	that	the	proper	function	(Millikan	
																																																								
1	An	anonymous	referee	wondered	whether	this	is	an	epistemic	or	a	metaphysical	
specification	of	mind.	My	reference	to	realism	reflects	arguments	given	elsewhere	
(e.g.,	Ross	et	al	2007)	that	Dennett’s	account	is	not	merely	epistemological;	
according	to	the	correct	interpretation	of	his	account,	scientists	should	take	the	
intentional	stance	only	where	they	would,	as	a	matter	of	objective	fact,	lose	access	to	
some	information	if	they	did	not	do	so.	What	it	is	to	be	a	mind	is	to	be	an	
information-processing	system	integrated	into	an	environment	in	such	a	way	as	to	
support	this	sort	of	counterfactual.	This	is	why,	for	Dennett,	minds	are	both	virtual	
and	real	entities.	
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1984)	of	a	mind	is,	following	Godfrey-Smith	(1996),	to	track	complex	environmental	
dynamics	that	are	detectable	along	multiple	informational	dimensions	that	require	
integration	to	be	exploited.	Such	integration	depends	on	adaptive	filtering,	that	is,	
uptake	of	a	restricted	subset	of	available	information	that	is	relevant	to	the	
organism’s	goals	and	maintenance	and	that	does	not	generate	cognitive	bottlenecks	
that	don’t	pay	for	themselves	with	respect	to	these	goals.	Since	filtering	involves	loss	
of	information,	it	is	epistemically	and	usually	practically	risky.	Among	recent,	
relatively	more	specific,	accounts	in	this	tradition,	Graziano	(2013)	emphasises	the	
function	of	mental	information-processing	to	focus	and	unify	attention	to	targets	
that	are	tracked	by	more	than	one	mode	of	primary	transduction,	and	which	depend	
for	integration	on	attentional	selectiveness.	
It	is	common	among	scientists	and	philosophers	to	suppose	that	mind	is	necessary	
but	not	sufficient	for	consciousness.2	A	more	advanced	capability	extending	beyond	
selective	integration	is	an	animal’s	ability	to	systematically	distinguish	changes	in	its	
information	that	result	from	its	own	actions	and	internal	state	changes	from	
changes	that	originate	exogenously.	Self-representation	(which	does	not	entail	
representing	aspects	of	the	self	as	such	aspects)	is,	on	this	common	conception,	
often	held	to	be	sufficient	for	at	least	minimal	consciousness	(Dennett	1991,	
Flanagan	1992).	
As	soon	as	we	admit	that	there	may	be	grades	of	consciousness,	as	implied	by	the	
expression	‘at	least	minimal	consciousness’,	we	can	ask	whether	the	gradation	
includes	discontinuities	that	might	motivate	distinctions	of	kind.	Graziano	(2013)	
promotes	a	specific	positive	answer	to	this	question,	arguing	that	fully	conscious	
self-representation,	of	the	kind	characteristic	of	humans,	is	a	particular	kind	of	more	
general	self-representation,	with	a	distinctive	evolutionary	history,	proper	function,	
and	neuroanatomical	basis.	Specifically,	Graziano	hypothesizes	that	human	
consciousness	is	characterized	by	awareness	of	the	focus	of	cross-modal	attention,	
possibly	relying	on	information	consolidated	in	the	Temporal	Parietal	Junction	and	
the	Superior	Temporal	Sulcas.	The	proper	function	of	this	consolidation	is	argued	to	
be	prediction	of	the	responses	of	agents,	which	in	humans	(at	least)	has	become	self-
reflexive.	Thus,	on	this	account,	distinctively	human	consciousness	has	its	basis	in	
social	cognition.	Referring	to	this	kind	of	consciousness	as	‘distinctively	human’	
reflects	the	fact	that	the	principal	evidence	for	awareness	of	unified	attention	is	that	
people	verbally	report	it,	and	explain	their	deliberative	choices	by	reference	to	it,	
whereas	there	is	no	non-controversial	evidence	of	any	non-human	animals	doing	so.	
I	will	henceforth	refer	to	the	hypothetically	distinctive	grade	of	consciousness	
typical	of	normal	humans	as	FHSC	for	‘fully	human-style	consciousness’.	This	
reference	is	intended	to	be	purely	extensional,	with	no	suggestion	that	there	is	
consensus	on	its	either	its	fine-grained	analysis	or	on	details	of	its	actual	
implementation.	
																																																								
2	The	idea	that	there	could	be	consciousness	without	mind	is	found	only	in	some	
mystical	traditions.	To	suggest	that	mind	is	sufficient	for	consciousness	would	imply	
a	maximally	deflationary	view	of	consciousness.		
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Graziano’s	account	can	be	distinguished	from	that	of	Dennett	(1991,	2017)	and	like-
minded	thinkers	(e.g.	Bogdan	1997,	2000,	2009,	2010)	who	argue	that	all	
consciousness,	including	its	human	manifestation,	is	a	virtual	by-product	of	certain	
modes	of	general	representation.	On	these	accounts,	the	content	and	processing	
substrata	of	consciousness	shift	with	context,	and	the	boundaries	of	consciousness	
are	imprecise	and	subject	to	functional	interpretation.	Virtualism	implies	less	basis	
for	seeking	a	distinct	neurodevelopmental	history	or	function	for	consciousness,	
once	we	have	identified	and	accounted	for	mechanisms	that	allow	for	basic	self-
representation.	Dennett	has,	in	all	of	his	writing	on	consciousness,	been	particularly	
skeptical	of	efforts	to	identify	consciousness	with	any	localizable	neural	
representations.	It	is	not	clear,	pending	philosophical	inquiry	of	a	kind	I	will	not	
attempt	here,	whether	Graziano’s	theory	and	virtualist	accounts	are	compatible.	I	
venture	that	this	will	depend	on	whether	a	full	philosophical	interpretation	of	
Graziano’s	theory	involves	what	Dennett	characterizes	as	‘double	transduction’	
(Dennett	1998).	If	not,	it	might	be	argued	that	when	Dennett’s	account	is	
supplemented	by	Graziano’s,	we	move	from	a	theory	of	consciousness	in	general	to	
a	theory	of	FHSC.	
For	present	purposes	I	need	only	identify	one	broad	point	of	agreement,	and	one	
broad	point	of	disagreement,	between	Graziano’s	theory	and	virtualist	accounts	of	
what	is	apparently,	in	the	current	state	of	knowledge,	distinctive	about	FHSC.	The	
point	of	agreement	is	that	it	evolved	under	selection	pressures	conditioned	on	the	
centrality	of	coordinated	social	expectations	in	the	human	ecological	niche.	The	
point	of	disagreement	is	over	whether	possession	of	language	was	a	necessary	
precursor	to	the	development	of	FHSC.	For	Graziano	there	could	in	principle	be	both	
non-linguistic	(e.g.,	neuroanatomical)	evidence	for,	and	non-linguistic	behavioural	
functions	that	selected	for,	FHSC.	By	contrast,	according	to	virtualists	language	is	
essential	to	FHSC	because	the	latter	is	constructed,	in	the	first	place,	through	
coordinated	public	representations	involving	displaced	reference3	and	folk	
theorizing	about	agency.	Dennett	has	always	defended	this	view,	but	gives	it	
particular	emphasis	in	his	(2017),	and	engages	directly	with	theorists	who	maintain	
that	FHSC,	along	with	narrative	selfhood	and	moral	responsiveness,	could	be	
engineered	by	AI	researchers	attending	narrowly	to	features	of	internal	cognitive	
architecture.	Against	such	theorists,	Dennett	argues	that	participation	in	reciprocal	
social	representations,	all	of	which	have	their	foundations	in	public	language,	is	a	
necessary	condition	for	FHSC,	which	is	in	turn	necessary	for	narrative	selfhood	and	
moral	responsiveness.	
The	reference	to	narrative	and	moral	responsiveness	brings	us	to	the	last	core	
concept	in	the	consciousness-related	cluster	with	which	I	am	concerned,	viz,	
personhood.	The	concept	is	in	the	first	place	derived	from	normative	social	
																																																								
3	This	concept,	with	its	origin	in	linguistics,	denotes	successful	communication	about	
objects	and	events	that	are	not	present	in	the	perceptual	field	of	at	least	one	party	to	
the	communication	in	question.	Communication	about	abstract,	hypothetical	or	
fictional	objects	and	events	necessarily	involves	displaced	reference.	
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practices,	so	its	scope	cannot	in	principle	be	fixed	by	reference	only	to	empirical	
facts	about	mind	and	consciousness.	However,	the	relevant	norm	is	arguably	that	it	
should	be	literally	applied	only	and	always	to	agents	that	have,	or	are	capable	of	
having,	a	certain	sort	of	conscious	self-representation.	The	dominant	recent	
philosophical	literature	descends	from	Parfit	(1984),	though	its	deeper	root	is	
attributed	to	Locke	(Flanagan	2017,	p.	189).	Though	this	literature	has	generated	a	
range	of	disputed	possible	refinements	to	Parfit’s	analysis,	present	purposes	will	not	
require	delving	into	these.	
Personhood	is	normatively	applied	to	agents	who	can	distinguish	between,	and	
represent	relationships	between,	past	and	future	perspectives	of	their	own	and	of	
others	as	past	and	future,	and	can	produce	histories	of	events	in	which	earlier	
episodes	are	jointly	understood	by	historian	and	audience	alike	as	partly	
explanatory	of	later	episodes,	by	reference	to	implicit	(or,	occasionally,	explicit)	
models	constructed	from	the	intentional	stance.	Persons	are	thus	answerable	to	
norms	of	coherence	in	behaviour	that	can	be	cited	as	regulative	reasons.	Only	a	
being	that	can	represent	itself	as	responsible	for	its	actions	and	feelings,	and	can	
reasonably	be	asked	to	justify	its	choices,	can	properly	be	held	answerable	to	
normative	requests	for	reasons.	
Although	‘properly’	here	is	normative,	the	restriction	can	be	justified	by	the	fact	that	
applying	expectations	of	rationalizing	explanation	to	beings	who	cannot	represent	
reasons	is	evidently	useless	for	social	regulation	and	cohesion,	and	these	objectives	
identify	the	proper	function	(in	the	sense	of	Millikan	1984)	of	the	norms	of	
personhood.	Furthermore,	a	person	must	be	able	to	represent	reasons	as	reasons	
for	her	actions,	and	thus	must	be	able	to	represent	a	conscious	self-model.	Thus	the	
view	that	non-human	animals	lack	the	basis	for	any	degree	of	narrative	selfhood,	
that	is,	cannot	characterize	their	own	behaviour	as	manifesting	goal-regulated	
patterns	of	action	and	judgment,	if	only	because	they	lack	‘genuine’	language,	is	
often	taken	as	entailing	that	no	non-humans	are	possibly	persons.		
We	might	thus	think	of	personhood	as	normative	assessment	of	the	capacities	for	
social	engagement	and	coordination	that	follow	from	FHSC	plus	capacity	for	
language,	if	Graziano	is	right	that	in	principle	FHSC	could	obtain	without	language,	
or	as	following	from	FHSC	alone	on	the	virtualist	understanding.	Ismael	(2016)	has	
recently	consolidated	and	generalized	just	such	an	account,	which	she	labels	the	
‘self-governance	model’	of	personhood	(SGP).		
As	explained	above,	personhood	is	normatively	applied	to	all	and	only	agents	who	
can	consciously	self-represent.	Personhood	is	normative	status	within	a	community	
that,	to	be	maintained,	requires	that	the	person	use	her	self-representation	to	
govern	such	aspects	of	her	corporeal	and	cognitive	processes	as	can	be	intentionally	
regulated	and	as	potentially	interact	with	the	interests	of	other	persons.		Ismael’s	
SGP	is	essentially	a	model	of	the	dynamics	of	this	control.	A	person	does	not	try	to	
micro-manage	her	body	or	brain	state	by	state,	which	would	almost	surely	be	
computationally	and	neurophysiologically	impossible.	Personal	governance	consists	
rather	in	maintaining	relative	coherence	among	intentional	expressions	and	actions	
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so	as	to	keep	them	aligned	with,	or	at	least	not	subversive	of,	meaningful	narratives	
told	by	the	person	when	she	is	probed,	by	herself	or	others,	for	self-explanation.	
Thus	the	SGP	supposes	that	personhood	could	not	arise	outside	of	a	strongly	socially	
regulated	context.	Though	public	reasons	and	norms	can	generate	private	ones,	the	
former	are	both	primary	and	most	effective,	due	to	the	crucial	causal	strength	of	
external	motivation,	stabilization,	and	reinforcement.	
A	few	philosophers	(e.g.	Davies	2009)	and	more	psychologists	(e.g.	Wegner	2002)	
have	depicted	minds	as	largely	or	wholly	after-the-fact	rationalizers	of	(some)	
bodily	/	neural	processes.	If	that	is	all	that	minds	did,	then	although	narrative	self-
representations	might	still	exist,	the	actual	narratives	would	be	myths,	and	personal	
responsibility	would	be	illusory.	But	although	minds	sometimes	merely	confabulate,	
self	models	also	generate	target	states	for	sub-personal	processes,	just	as	states	of	
the	external	environment	do.	Such	regulation	can	be	more	or	less	consistent	and	
complete.	The	extent	to	which	cognition	and	behaviour	are	regulated	by	reference	
to	publicly	communicable	reasons	is	the	extent	of	personhood	in	which	the	
organism	in	question	participates.	Some	human	minds	–	the	mind	of	a	“wanton”	in	
Ismael’s	judicious	phrasing,	or	the	mind	of	a	newly	talking	child	–	may	be	regulated	
by	their	associated	persons	only	fitfully	and	erratically.	Some	people	are	governed	
tyrannically	and	obsessively	by	reference	to	normative	self-models	(see	Ainslie	
2001),	others	gracefully	but	with	boundaries	clear	and	stable	enough	to	support	
self-confidence	and	social	trust.	
On	this	conception,	personhood	–	the	disposition	to	regulate	behaviour	and	thought	
by	reference	to	socially	sharable	reasons	–	is	a	normatively	guided	exercise	of	FHSC.	
Arguably	it	is	the	standard	diagnostic	indicator	of	such	consciousness,	since	as	
argued	by	various	theorists	(Donald	1991,	Dennett	1991,	Bickerton	2014),	FHSC	
went	to	fixation	in	the	human	genome	because	it	supports	satisfaction	of	the	
expectations	of	personhood,	and	this	in	turn	allowed	ancestral	humans	to	perform	
tasks	requiring	deep	cooperation.	Indeed,	it	would	not	be	too	misleading	to	say	that	
on	this	perspective,	personhood	is	a	kind	of	consciousness:	the	representation	of	
motivations	integrated	by	reference	to	socially	recognizable	reasons.	
3.	Skepticism	about	non-human	personhood	and	the	question	of	non-human	language	
In	emphasizing	the	importance	of	narrative	to	FHSC,	Dennett,	Ismael,	Bickerton,	and	
numerous	other	theorists	make	language	an	essential	feature.	This	is	in	turn	the	
basis	on	which	these	authors	join	the	wider	consensus	in	denying	that	non-human	
animals	are	persons	to	any	extent.	Theorists	who	maintain	that	occasional	
individual	animals	have	acquired	some	degree	of	personal	selfhood	to	some	extent	
(e.g.	Savage-Rumbaugh,	Shanker	and	Taylor	1998,	Pepperberg	2002)	have	almost	
always	done	so	on	the	basis	of	arguing	that	the	animals	in	question	have	acquired	
some	degree	of	genuine	language	competence	through	human	intervention	in	their	
development.	
Untenable	stipulative	rigidity	about	extending	the	concept	of	language	is	required	
for	denying	that	some	individual	non-human	animals,	such	as	Savage-Rumbaugh’s	
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Kanzi	(a	bonobo)	and	Pepperberg’s	Alex	(an	African	grey	parrot),	have	learned	
some	human	language.	However,	the	overwhelmingly	dominant	view	among	
scientists	and	philosophers	is	that	no	animals	have	their	own	natural	language.4	A	
major	part	of	the	empirical	basis	for	this	near-consensus	is	that	our	closest	living	
relatives,	chimpanzees	and	bonobos,	can	learn	human	language	only	with	great	
difficulty	when	intensively	taught	by	people,	and	even	then	learn	it	only	to	levels	of	
competence	too	limited	to	appear	to	be	useful	outside	the	laboratory.	However,	the	
skeptical	literature	here	has	generally	not	focused	on	the	aspects	of	language	–	
narrative	and	explicit	self-representation	as	answerable	to	social	norms	of	
rationality	–	directly	associated	with	FHSC.	Presupposing	a	broadly	Chomskyan	
framework,	they	have	instead	motivated	doubt	that	any	non-human	animal	
communication	systems	feature	recursive	syntax	(Corballis	2014).	This	in	turn	has	
inspired	skepticism	about	capacities	for	displaced	reference.	The	second	doubt	
impinges	indirectly	on	non-humans’	capacity	for	FHSC	and	personhood,	since	
displaced	reference	is	arguably	a	prerequisite	for	representation	of	general	
normative	reasons.5	
This	conceptual	link	between	the	traditional	skepticism	about	animal	
representational	complexity	and	our	present	concerns	is	frayed,	however.	Even	so	
mainstream	an	evolutionary	linguist	as	Bickerton	(2014),	who	does	not	suppose	
that	non-human	animals	manifest	FHSC,	no	longer	doubts	that	even	animals	as	
cognitively	simple	as	honeybees	achieve	displaced	reference.	On	the	other	hand,	it	
might	be	agreed	that	narrative	about	displaced	episodes	likely	couldn’t	do	the	
cognitive	work	that	it	is	called	upon	to	perform	in	governing	counter-normative	
motivational	impulses,	on	Ismael’s	account,	without	recursive	syntax.	Let	us	
therefore	attend	to	that	most	widely	rehearsed	basis	for	deflationary	accounts	of	
non-human	animal	cognitive	complexity.		
With	the	exception	of	Alex	the	parrot	(Pepperberg	2002),	the	only	non-human	
animals	who	have	been	subjected	to	systematic	attempts	at	imparting	recursive	
syntax	have	been	apes.	The	consensus	is	correct	that	the	apes’	achievements	in	that	
area	have	been	dismal	(Anderson	2004).	Given	their	self-evident	intelligence	and	
facility	with	semantic	reference,	the	conclusion	that	non-hominid	apes	are	both	
cognitively	and	ecologically	unprepared	for	language	is	solidly	motivated.	If	one	
accepts	a	premise	to	the	effect	that	“if	any	non-human	animals	have	language	it	
must	be	our	near	relatives,”	then	from	the	apparent	natural	alingualism	of	chimps	
and	bonobos	one	can	conclude	that	humans	are	probably	the	only	language-
																																																								
4	This	is	stated	as	the	scientific	consensus	even	by	a	leading	popular	champion	of	the	
cognitive	and	emotional	depth	and	complexity	of	various	species,	Carl	Safina	(2015).	
5	A	natural	argument	would	proceed	from	the	premise	that	reasons	usually	involve	
at	least	implicit	generalizations	over	more	instances	than	are	available	to	mutual	
observation	in	the	moment	the	reason	is	invoked.	Stronger	and	more	specific	
premises,	locating	the	basis	for	normative	reasons	in	consideration	of	hypothetical	
scenarios,	are	considered	by	Suddendorf	(2013).	
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endowed	species.	This	conclusion	is	frequently	drawn	(e.g.	Scott-Phillips	2014;	
Berwick	and	Chomsky	2015).	
The	premise,	however,	is	a	strong	assumption.	Convergent	evolution6	is	ubiquitous	
in	nature	(McGhee	2011):	wings	(Alexander	2015),	social	intelligence	(Emery	and	
Clayton	2004)	and	numerous	protein	structures	evolved	separately	and	repeatedly,	
mainly	because	local	physics	typically	constitutes	a	tight	canal	when	selection	
pressures	for	complex	functions	arise.	Social	intelligence	characterizes	a	wide	range	
of	non-primate	mammals	and	birds	that	have	close	but	relatively	asocial	relatives.	
One	might	argue	that	humans	are	most	profoundly	ecologically	distinguished	from	
the	other	surviving	apes	precisely	in	having	been	selected	for	hypersociality7,	and	
that	one	should	not	expect	language	to	evolve	except	on	a	platform	of	hypersocial	
niche	construction	(Seyfarth	and	Cheney	2017).	If	such	an	argument	is	thought	to	
have	force,	then	our	leading	non-human	candidates	for	language	should	be	other	
hypersocial	species	meeting	additional	criteria,	and	not	non-hominid	apes,	whose	
social	motivations	are	significantly	less	dominant	over	general	behaviour	than	in	
humans,	and	in	a	number	of	other	highly	intelligent	species	(see	below).	
Another	plausible	criterion	for	demarcating	the	search	space	for	non-human	
language	is	extensive	frontal	cortex,	at	least	in	mammals.	However,	it	would	be	rash	
to	apply	this	criterion	to	the	architecturally	distinct,	and	poorly	understood,	brains	
of	birds.	A	more	persuasive	general	criterion	is	having	a	range	of	acoustic	variation	
in	vocalizations	sufficient	to	possibly	support	lexicons	and	hierarchies	of	
grammatical	markers	of	approximately	human	levels	of	complexity.			
As	candidates	for	language,	toothed	whales,	elephants,	corvids,	and	parrots	survive	
the	triple	filter	of	non-hypersociality,	limited	frontal	cortex	(in	mammals),	and	low	
density	of	acoustic	variation.	In	particular,	the	acoustic	signals	in	this	candidate	
group	show	high	variation	along	the	dimensions	that	have	been	measured	–	which	
may,	furthermore,	be	incomplete	because	only	variation	within	arbitrarily	short	
frames	has	been	attended	to	systematically.		Of	course,	that	a	few	animals	might,	for	
all	we	can	presently	tell,	have	recursive	syntax	and/or	displaced	reference	doesn’t	
constitute	evidence	that	they	actually	do.	No	one	is	in	a	position	to	reject	the	null	
hypothesis	that	they	do	not.		
																																																								
6	This	is	the	standard	term	for	the	widely	observed	tendency	of	species	that	occupy	
similar	ecological	niches	to	show	strong	morphological	and	behavioural	homologies,	
even	when	their	last	common	ancestor	is	very	remote	and	their	respective	closest	
relatives	are	highly	dis-similar	to	one	another.	Canid	and	marsupial	wolves	furnish	
one	of	many	examples.		
7	By	‘hypersociality’	I	refer	to	a	complex	of	natural	dispositions	to	pursue	joint	and	
coordinated	activity	for	its	own	sake,	outside	of	specialized	settings	to	which	it	is	
narrowly	functionally	adapted,	such	as	sex	and	intergroup	conflict.	This	is	the	basis	
for	empirically	motivated	skepticism	about	chimpanzee	and	bonobo	participation	in	
FHSC	and	personhood	that	has	been	urged	by	Carpenter	and	Tomasello	(1995),	
Penn	and	Povinelli	(2007),	and	Silk	(2009),	among	many	others.		
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We	are	unlikely,	however,	to	successfully	decode	the	communication	systems	of	
these	animals	if	we	impose	the	presupposition	that	they	cannot	be	languages	on	
analyses	of	the	acoustic	streams,	and	then	this	presupposition	turns	out	to	be	false	
(Everett	2017).	If	the	acoustic	streams8	embed	languages,	then	we	will	only	be	able	
to	discover	this	by	actively	testing	for	the	characteristic	signatures	of	recursion	and	
displaced	reference.	The	alternative,	assuming	that	every	signal	is	at	most	an	atomic	
expression	of	a	discrete	feeling	or	a	direct	response	to	an	observable	stimulus,	
would	ensure	that	nothing	more	would	ever	be	detected.	The	fact	that	this	
assumption	has	dominated	research	on	animal	communication	undermines	
confidence	in	the	null	hypothesis.	In	fairness	to	this	research	tradition,	it	is	far	from	
clear	that	the	null	hypothesis	about	animal	language	within	the	possible	candidate	
set	has	historically	been	testable	at	all.	The	principles	of	hypothetical	elephant,	
whale,	corvid	or	parrot	languages,	given	that	they	would	have	been	genetically	and	
culturally	selected	for	manipulating	social	umwelten	discontinuous	with	those	that	
shaped	human	language	development,	would	not	likely	reveal	their	structure	to	the	
traditional	techniques	of	code	breaking	that	depend	on	strong	hypotheses	about	
both	communicative	intentions	and	natural	ontologies.		
Prior	to	the	development	of	massively	parallel	pattern-spotting	computers,	the	
ambition	to	decode	the	signals	of	animals	that	emit	acoustic	patterns	dense	enough	
to	possibly	have	recursive	syntactic	structure	was	arguably	beyond	plausible	
scientific	reach.	However,	the	deep-learning,	pattern-seeking	computer	technology	
that	is	generating	new	excitement	about	AI	may	supply	the	tools	needed	to	
overcome	prior	investigative	limitations.	Deep-learning	algorithms	are	promising	
analytical	instruments	for	two	reasons:	first,	because	of	their	raw	statistical	
discovery	power,	and,	second,	because	in	their	mindless	responsiveness	to	mere	but	
recurrent	and	structured	patterns	they	can	avoid	the	limitations	of	tying	hypotheses	
about	semantics	too	closely	to	the	dimensions	of	meaning	that	contingently	matter	
to	people.		
Future	rejection	of	the	null	hypothesis	concerning	recursive	syntax	and	displaced	
reference	would	hardly	by	itself	show	that	any	animals	naturally	use	language	to	
perform	the	narrative	and	self-regulative	roles	conceptualized	by	extant	theories	of	
FHSC	and	by	Ismael’s	SGP.	In	particular,	some	animals	might	have	language	but	not	
put	it	to	work	constructing	and	sharing	normatively	weighted	narratives.	Recursive	
syntax	and	displaced	reference	might	thus	be	regarded	as	(naturally)	necessary	but	
not	sufficient	conditions	for	FHSC	and	some	degree	of	personhood.		
Should	we	reach	the	stage	of	knowledge	where	we	can	communicate	with	some	
animals	using	their	own	languages,	then	we	will	enjoy	vastly	improved	leverage	for	
assessing	the	(naturally)	sufficient	conditions.	In	the	meantime	we	can	only	attend	
to	such	behavioural	patterns	as	are	relevant	to	our	philosophical	speculation.	It	is	
																																																								
8	Use	of	the	word	‘streams’	here	suggests	semantic	and	pragmatic	interpretation	along	a	linear	
temporal	dimension.	This	may	be	a	strong	restriction,	since	some	animals	might	use	multiple	
signaling	channels,	including	gestural	and	tactile	ones	that	semantically	cross-inflect	one	another	on	
different	temporal	scales.	As	we	will	see	below,	elephants	furnish	a	probable	example	of	this.	
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relatively	clear	in	all	of	the	candidate	species	that	a	primary,	though	not	exclusive,	
purpose	of	signaling	is	mediation	of	social	relationships,	including	identification	of	
individuals	and	conflict	management	(Richards	and	Thompson	1978;	Langbauer	
2000;	McComb	et	al	2000;	Pepperberg	2002;	McComb	et	al	2003;	Garstang	2004;	
Soltis	et	al	2005a,	2005b).	Individuals	in	each	of	the	candidate	species	have	
idiosyncratic	vocal	‘signatures’	that	allow	members	of	their	conspecific	groups	to	re-
identify	them,	and	this	plausibly	partly	explains	their	demonstrated	retention	of	
memories,	after	long	absences,	of	other	individual	organisms	and	of	their	social	
affiliation	status.	Crows	additionally	remember	individual	humans	with	whom	
interaction	has	not	been	reciprocal,	and	they	communicate	their	varying	responses	
to	different	specific	humans	to	one	another	(Marzluff	et	al	2010).	With	the	exception	
of	parrots,	which	don’t	appear	to	have	been	studied	in	this	respect,	all	of	the	
candidates	display	unusual	preoccupation	with	dead	conspecifics	(McComb	et	al	
2006;	Dudzinski	et	al	2003;	Swift	&	Marzluff	2015).	This	has	various	possible	
explanations,	but	the	phenomenon	is	noteworthy	here	because	it	hints	at	the	
possibility	of	episodic	memory	and	of	generalized	response	to	classes	of	events	that	
are	highly	salient	occasions	for	narrative	understanding	in	humans.	(To	understand	
that	someone	is	dead,	one	must	recognize	that	the	corpse	is	continuous	with	a	
formerly	living	specific	individual.9)	All	the	candidates	show	within-species	cultural	
variation	in	acoustic	signaling	and	response,	though	in	different	dimensions,	and	in	
orcas	females	that	change	pods	adopt	the	culture	of	their	new	group	following	a	
period	of	adjustment	that	also	involves	gradual	onset	of	the	adopting	pod’s	acoustic	
signaling	patterns	(Ford	1991;	Strager	1995;	Saulitis	et	al	2005).	
4.	Elephants	
In	selecting	a	species	from	among	the	candidate	group	on	which	to	focus	for	more	
detailed	application	of	the	principles	being	explored,	elephants	present	some	
advantages.	Where	whales	are	concerned	the	aquatic	environment,	with	its	
profoundly	alien	ecological	constraints	and	affordances,	is	likely	to	constitute	a	
particularly	formidable	access	barrier.	Birds	present	a	different	disadvantage:	the	
natural	power	asymmetry	humans	exert	with	respect	to	them	makes	it	intrinsically	
difficult	to	observe	their	communication	at	close	quarters	without	causing	their	
attention	to	focus	mainly	on	the	scientist	rather	than	on	other	birds.	This	is	
unproblematic	when	the	aim	is	to	investigate	an	animal’s	ability	to	learn	human	
language,	as	in	Pepperberg	(2002).	But	if	she	had	been	interested	in	the	question	of	
whether	parrots	talk	naturally,	in	parrot,	Pepperberg	would	have	confronted	the	
challenge	that	they	might	sensibly	not	attempt	to	do	so	when	interacting	with	an	
agent	showing	wholescale	failure	to	respond	appropriately	to	even	the	most	basic	
messages.	Elephants	are	perhaps	more	likely	to	focus	their	communicative	attention	
																																																								
9	An	anonymous	referee	objects	that	the	majority	of	animals	can	distinguish	dead	
conspecifics	from	living	ones	and	from	other	dead	things.	This	is	why	I	emphasise	
awareness	that	“someone	is	dead.”	The	species	to	which	I	refer	appear	to	be	
particularly	interested	in	the	corpses	of	individuals	with	whom	they	were	
acquainted.	
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on	conspecifics	even	when	their	environment	is	made	unnatural	by	the	obtrusive	
presence	of	a	human	scientist.	
Elephants	communicate	using	two	known	acoustic	channels:	low-frequency	rumbles,	
transmitted	through	both	the	air	and	the	ground,	for	long-distance	messages,	and	
higher-frequency	laryngeal	grunting	and	squawking	at	close	quarters.	Signals	of	
individual	identity	are	reserved	for	the	former	context	(Soltis	et	al	2005a),	perhaps	
because	there	is	no	Gricean	reason	why	an	elephant	would	declare	her	identity	to	a	
conspecific	who	can	see	who	she	is.	The	long-distance	communication	system	is	by	
far	the	better	understood,	because	the	absence	of	non-acoustic	signaling	support	
facilitates	isolation	of	behavioural	effects	of	received	messages	(Langbauer	2000;	
Garstang	2004).	Elephants	can	demonstrably	learn	and	remember	the	identity	
signatures	of	at	least	100	individuals	(McComb	et	al	2000),	and	behaviourally	
distinguish	at	least	two	general	classes	of	interactants:	close	genetic	relatives	versus	
distantly	related	or	unrelated	others,	and	females	versus	males	(McComb	et	al	
2003).	A	database	of	recordings,	matched	to	behavioural	observations,	and	
attempting	to	capture	the	meanings	of	acoustic,	visual,	and	tactile	signals,	is	now	
starting	to	accumulate	in	the	research	community	(Elephant	Voices	2018).	Among	
interpreted	long-distance	messages	found	in	this	data	base,	aside	from	identity	
signals,	scientists	have	isolated	indications	of	food	and	water	locations	and	
warnings	about	beehives	and	lions.	Interpreted	close-quarters	messages	include	
indicators	of	a	range	of	emotional	states,	and	signals	that	precede	mustering	for	
travel	after	a	herd	has	been	enjoying	a	water	or	mud	hole	or	concentrated	food	
patch.	In	addition,	elephants	have	a	range	of	standard	trunk	and	head	gestures	that	
carry	mutually	understood	signals.	Finally,	they	have	receptors	for	processing	
information	from	tactile	probes	with	their	trunks,	which,	given	the	precision	control	
they	enjoy	over	their	highly	labile	trunk	lips,	can	support	fine	discriminations.	They	
clearly	communicate	information	by	touching	one	another	in	specific	ways	and	
places.		
The	existence	of	multiple	means	of	communication	is	important,	because	syntax		
could	be	encoded	through	modulation	across	channels.	That	is,	varying	states	in	one	
channel	could	introduce	general	but	systematically	related	changes	to	the	meanings	
of	signals	in	another	channel.	In	the	human	symbol	system,	for	example,	two	
identically	shaped	arrows	can	mean	‘turn!’	and	‘don’t	turn!’	if	they’re	modulated	by	
a	second	code	system	in	which	green	means	‘go!’	and	red	means	‘stop!’	It	is	worth	
emphasizing	that	none	of	this	interpretation	amounts	to	evidence	of	language;	it	is	
merely	information	that	could	constitute	anchoring	wedges	for	the	kind	of	pattern	
analysis	that	would	be	a	necessary	part	of	the	methodology	for	seeking	such	
evidence.	
Our	question	of	interest	is	the	status	of	evidence	for	and	against	the	hypothesis	that	
elephants	represent	and	communicate	normative	reasons.	Familiarity	with	the	
human	case	reminds	us	that	they	might	do	this	mainly	or	exclusively	through	
narratives	that	trigger	normatively	favoured	emotions,	rather	than	by	formulating	
and	propounding	explicit	rules.	In	this	context,	the	null	hypothesis	is	that	elephant	
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signals,	whether	linguistic	or	not,	are	mere	indicators	of	current	states	of	either	the	
signaler	or	the	environment	and	are	not	intended	to	regulate	conspecifics’	
behaviour.	Applying	Ismael’s	account	of	self-governance	of	such	communicators,	
this	would	amount	to	framing	elephants	as	resembling		
people	whose	psyche	is	organized	more	like	an	anarchy	than	a	self-
governing	collective,	i.e.,	people	whose	behaviour	at	any	moment	is	
guided	by	whatever	drive	or	desire	happens	to	be	strongest.	Such	
people	are	like	a	country	full	of	warring	factions	in	which	anyone	can	
gain	ascendency	from	one	moment	to	the	next.	There	is	no	
consistency	at,	or	over,	time:	no	coherence	in	action,	no	planning,	and	
no	sustained	projects.	It	is	true	in	the	case	of	such	people	that	there	is	
no	one	in	control,	in	the	same	way	that	it	is	true	that	there	is	no	one	in	
control	of	the	behavior	of	an	ant	colony,	or	a	free	market	economy.	
Having	someone	in	control	demands	the	kind	of	unity	and	central	
organizing	structure	found	in	a	self-governing	system	(Ismael	2016,	p.	
102).	
To	develop	this	null	hypothesis	as	it	would	apply	to	elephants,	let	us	first	sketch	
some	of	the	relevant	social	context,	confining	ourselves	to	features	that	are	salient	in	
all	general	accounts	and	have	been	known	for	many	years.	Elephant	communities,	in	
the	sense	of	groups	within	which	individual	identities	are	commonly	known,	are	
loose	associations	of	coherent	sub-groups	–	herds	–	that	are	sexually	dimorphic	in	
structure.	Herds	of	cows	and	youngsters	are	typically	groups	of	between	3	and	25	
individuals	led	by	a	behaviourally	identifiable	matriarch,	who	is	often	but	not	
always	the	oldest	member	and	the	mother,	grandmother,	sister	or	aunt	of	the	others.	
Bulls	form	small	bachelor	herds	with	much	looser	and	more	contestable	leadership,	
and	individual	bulls	will	temporarily	join	female	herds	when	a	member	of	the	
former	is	in	estrus.	Matriarchs	appear	to	make	decisions	about	when	and	where	the	
herd	should	travel,	but	are	sensitive	to	signals	from	other	adult	females.	
A	particularly	relevant	and	well	documented	episode	in	elephant	societies	is	
reported	by	Slotow	et	al	(2000)	and	Slotow	and	van	Dyk	(2001),	and	discussed	
extensively	by	Bradshaw	(2009).	For	a	number	of	years	southern	African	wildlife	
managers	culled	herds	to	prevent	over-population	from	threatening	habitat	
sustainability.	Typically	culls	would	focus	deliberately,	though	not	exclusively,	on	
older	bulls	who	had	already	made	substantial	genetic	contributions.	In	consequence,	
in	two	South	African	reserves	in	the	1990s	young	bulls	were	relocated	to	constitute	
new	bachelor	herds,	without	any	older	bulls	to	provide	leadership.	This	had	
dramatic	unexpected	consequences.	The	young	bulls	displayed	recurrent,	atypical,	
lethal	violence	against	rhinoceroses,	and	were	occasionally	observed	forcing	
copulations	with	them	(Bradshaw	2009).	In	the	Pilansberg	reserve,	over	40	rhinos	
were	killed	by	young	bull	elephants	between	1992	and	1997.	At	the	end	of	that	
period	the	rangers,	conjecturing	that	the	unusual	behaviour	resulted	from	lack	of	
regulation	by	older	bulls,	relocated	such	possible	authorities	into	the	bachelor	herd	
from	other	parks.	The	violence	against	rhinos	then	ceased	abruptly.		
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In	elephants,	as	in	all	mammals,	patterns	in	sexual	response	are	partly	regulated	by	
fluctuations	in	hormone	levels.	The	peak	state	of	a	male’s	hormonal	cycle,	known	as	
musth,	has	dramatic	physiological	and	behavioural	effects.	An	elephant	in	musth	
typically	excretes	liquid	from	glands	on	his	temples,	dribbles	urine,	walks	with	a	
special	swagger,	and	crushes	imaginary	foes	into	the	ground	with	his	tusks.	As	the	
last	behaviour	implies,	elephant	males	in	musth	tend	to	be	highly	aggressive,	
primarily	against	other	male	elephants.	
In	the	Pilansberg	episode,	one	effect	of	the	introduction	of	the	older	bulls	was	that	
musth	periods	for	the	younger	ones	reduced	in	both	frequency	and	duration.	This	
can	be	given	a	straightforward	adaptive	explanation:	being	in	musth	is	dangerous	to	
an	elephant	if	there	are	stronger	bulls	around.	Knowing	this	might	lead	us	to	doubt	
that	the	regulation	of	young	bull	behaviour	by	the	older	ones	had	any	cognitive	
aspect.	However,	the	full	set	of	facts	cannot	be	explained	by	recourse	only	to	
endocrine	system	influence.	The	young	males	in	Pilansberg	did	not	cease	to	enter	
musth	altogether	after	the	older	bulls	joined	them;	they	just	entered	it	less	often	and	
stayed	in	it	for	shorter	periods	of	time.	Yet	they	attacked	no	more	rhinos	at	all.	
Second,	the	older	bulls,	who	entered	musth	more	often	and	stayed	in	it	longer,	never	
attacked	rhinos.	Thus	the	crucial	point	remains	that	violence	against	rhinos	is	highly	
abnormal	elephant	behaviour,	but	was	a	recurrent	pattern	among	the	survivors	of	
violent	culls	prior	to	their	exposure	to	older	males.	Although	hormonal	influences	
are	almost	certainly	what	connect	elephant	reproductive	dynamics	with	aggressive	
behaviour,	male	elephants	evidently	learn	to	control	this	aggression,	and	this	
learning	occurs	under	the	influence	of	older	male	elephants.		
Maintenance	of	elephant	social	structure	is	compatible	with	our	null	hypothesis.	
Elephants	might	simply	respond,	both	in	selecting	their	own	behaviours	and	in	
emitting	signals	that	influence	others,	to	their	own	emotional	states	as	these	arise.	
Consider	first	the	matriarch’s	decision	to	lead	the	herd	from	one	site	to	another.	She	
might	simply	find	herself	feeling	restless	after	a	certain	time,	respond	to	this	urge	
for	going	with	a	call	that	causes	her	herd	to	attend	to	her,	and	then	set	off	on	a	path	
she	has	been	conditioned	by	experience	to	prefer,	or	in	the	direction	of	reinforcing	
long-distance	calls	she	has	received	from	known	individuals	in	other	herds.	Or	
consider	an	older	bull	‘teaching’	a	younger	one	appropriate	behaviour.	This	could	be	
largely	conducted,	without	any	pedagogical	intentions,	simply	by	signaling	
annoyance	whenever	the	‘student’	does	something	that	irritates	him.	The	resulting	
conditioning	would	be	socially	useful	just	in	case	the	older	elephant’s	emotional	
responses	are	relatively	representative	of	evolved	adaptive	dispositions.	We	might	
then	say	that	natural	selection	operated	normative	control,	but	this	would	be	a	
metaphor	because	natural	selection	has	no	normative	standards.		
The	null	hypothesis	is,	on	the	other	hand,	false	if	elephants	do	or	experience	any	of	
the	following.	Perhaps,	as	modeled	by	Graziano’s	(2013)	theory	of	consciousness,	
they	are	aware	of	their	own	attention	schemata.	Perhaps	they	can	refer,	with	
normative	shading,	either	to	these	states	of	awareness	and	/	or	to	their	own	
emotional	states	and	those	of	others,	thereby	encouraging	modulation	of	such	states	
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by	conspecifics’	responses.	Matriarchs	might	make	genuine	plans	concerning	group	
movements,	and	use	signals	that	differentially	refer	to	such	plans	by	assembling	
them	out	of	syntactically	distinct	elements.	Matriarchs’	observed	sensitivity	to	
others’	vocalizations	at	decision	points	might	involve	consideration	of	alternative,	
expressed	preferences.	Perhaps	these	are	supported	by	reasons.	There	might	be	an	
elephant	vocalization	that	would	most	reasonably	be	modeled	as	expressing	a	
proposition	along	the	lines	of	“what	you	are	doing	is	bad”	and	these	vocalizations	
could	turn	out	to	feature	in	the	socialization	of	young	elephants.	Certainly	young	
elephants	are	regularly	physically	chastised	by	their	mothers,	including	for	bullying	
smaller	youngsters	of	other	mothers	(Bradshaw	2009);	so	a	hypothesis	of	
regulation	by	reference	to	an	explicit	rule	would	add	nothing	to	known	behaviour	
but	the	conjecture	that	elephant	vocalizations	have	generalizable	normative	force.	
Perhaps	elephants	remember	their	own	lives	partly	by	remembering	the	force	of	
cause-effect	relationships	drawn	to	their	attention	by	others,	and	to	that	extent	have	
conscious	narrative	selves.	
These	conjectures	are	likely	to	seem	incredible,	and	credulous.	But	the	point	of	the	
present	exercise	is	to	ask	why	–	in	particular,	on	the	basis	of	what	empirical	
evidence	–	they	appear	to	be	extravagant.	They	depend,	after	all,	only	on	the	idea	
that	elephants	(i)	might	operate	recursive	syntax	and	refer	to	events	and	individuals	
not	present	to	observation,	and	(ii)	might	recognize	norms	of	group	cohesion	and	
standards	and	refer	to	them	as	a	basis	for	governing	emotions	and	impulses,	both	
their	own	and	those	of	others.	We	have	no	direct	evidence	against	either	of	these	
possibilities.	It	would	perhaps	be	genuinely	extravagant	to	imagine	that	elephants	
motivate	one	another	by	producing	philosophical	arguments	or	spinning	exemplary	
fictions.	But	even	the	evidence	that	they	do	not	do	these	things	is	merely	indirect	
(see	below).	So	it	is	worth	asking	why	the	hypothesis	of	elephant	moral	philosophy	
seems	outlandish.	Does	our	answer	to	that	question	suggest	anything	about	why	we	
might	best	expect	that	elephants	fall	short	of	FHSC	and	are	not,	at	least	to	some	
extent,	persons?	
A	main	element	of	indirect	evidence	against	the	extravagant	hypothesis	is	that	we	
don’t	seem	to	observe	the	extent	of	variation	in	elephant	behaviour	that	we	might	
expect	if	elephants	could	use	recursive	and	displaced	reference	to	specify	
counterfactual	states	of	affairs.	Contrast	this	with	humans:	one	might	joke	that	any	
physically	possible	action	a	human	can	take	that	some	human	has	explicitly	and	
publicly	imagined	has	been	performed	sometime	by	some	human;	and	the	joke	
works	because	it	exaggerates	the	facts	about	humans’	observed	behavioural	
plasticity	only	slightly.	
The	inference	from	lack	of	observed	behavioural	variance	to	absence	of	FHSC	is	not	
obviously	cogent.	There	is	no	universal	natural	metric,	even	across	human	cultures	
let	alone	across	species	barriers,	against	which	to	measure	extent	of	conformity	to	
and	departure	from	standards	of	behavioural	normality.	For	all	we	can	tell	by	
watching	them,	however	systematically,	elephants	might	regularly	do	things	that,	by	
the	subtle	(to	us)	standards	of	elephant	expectations,	or	alternatively	by	the	lights	of	
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extreme	conservatism	that	might	characterize	their	psychologies,	strike	other	
elephants	as	astounding	departures	from	convention.	People	who	have	spent	
extended	time	with	autonomous	(i.e.,	wild	or	semi-wild)	female	elephants	know	
from	experience	the	frequent	signs	of	emotional	stirring	and	relaxation	that	ebb	and	
flow	through	their	groups,	accompanied	by	telltale	signs	of	continuous	mutual	
attention,	even	though	they	seldom	do	anything	that	seems	strikingly	novel	to	
human	standards.	Might	we	overlook	evidence	of	FHSC	in	elephants	simply	because	
they	are	very	conservative	by	comparison	with	humans?	Obtaining	evidence	on	the	
relative	behavioural	conservatism	of	species,	a	neglected	theme	in	the	story	of	
evolution,	is	the	context	in	which	my	colleagues	and	I	are	attempting	to	
experimentally	elicit	risk	preferences	of	African	elephants.	
Reflection	on	the	arguments	for	the	social	basis	of	FHSC,	particularly	those	of	the	
virtualists	such	as	Dennett,	suggests	that	in	trying	to	appreciate	the	basis	for	our	
intuitive	doubt	that	elephants	are	highly	conservative	persons,	we	look	in	the	wrong	
sort	of	place	if	we	focus	on	hypothesized	internal	cognitive	states	and	resources.	
The	more	persuasive	evidence	is	social	and	cultural.	And	even	if	we	are	persuaded	
by	the	account	of	Graziano	(2013),	and	so	think	that	we	might	look	for	evidence	of	
elephant	FHSC	by	somehow	contriving	to	obtain	functional	neuroimaging	data	
about	them,	we	should	still	predict	that	elephant	consciousness	would	constitute	an	
instance	of	FHSC,	and	thereby	support	personhood,	only	given	social	scaffolding	of	a	
kind	that	makes	normative	reasoning	socially	cumulative.	
Though	elephants	inflict	large-scale	modifications	on	their	physical	environments,	
there	is	no	sign	that	they	can	construct	and	maintain	historical	records	of	such	
thoughts	as	they	have.	This	implies	a	strong	sense	in	which	their	personal	selfhood,	
if	they	participate	in	any	at	all,	is	sharply	diminished	by	comparison	with	that	of	
humans.	According	to	the	thesis	associated	with	Dennett	(1991),	Clark	(1997),	and	
Sterelny	(2003),	human	brains	produce	virtual	minds,	and	people	build	the	basis	for	
collective	coordination	on	normative	expectations	(epistemic,	practical,	and	moral)	
through	construction	of	informational	niches	that	rely	on	social	scaffolding.	Human	
minds	and	the	persons	constructed	by	means	of	them	depend	on	recorded	history,	
art,	industry,	and	an	accumulated	built	environment,	which	constitute	a	public	
record	of	actual	events,	hypothetical	narratives,	conventional	relationships,	and	
comprehensible	collective	fantasies.	There	is	no	evidence	at	all	that	elephants	have	
any	of	this.	This,	I	suggest,	is	our	best	reason	for	believing	that	even	if	elephants	
have	and	use	aspects	of	language	and	abstract	normativity	–	that	is,	if	they	use	
narrative	memories	and	social	norms	to	govern	their	emotions,	impulses	and	
decisions	–	they	are	likely	not	conscious	of	themselves	as	participants	in	
maintaining,	let	alone	in	extending,	refining,	and	improving,	a	social	order	regulated	
by	reason.	But	such	consciousness	is	plausibly	the	distinguishing	feature	of	FHSC,	
and	what	makes	normal	humans	persons.	
5.	Conclusion:	Elephant	capacity	for	personhood?	
The	above	reflections	have	not	supported	enhanced	grounds	for	believing	that	
elephants	are	endowed	with	FHSC,	even	when	we	set	aside	the	largely	dogmatic,	
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albeit	widely	shared,	belief	that	they	lack	language.	Many	philosophers,	ethologists	
and	comparative	psychologists	defend	persuasive	theories	of	FHSC	and	of	
personhood	that	support	inference	to	the	effect	that	these	endowments	require	
social	engineering	of	environments	that	support	accumulated	collective	normative	
wisdom	(Sterelny	2003).	However,	this	reasoning	has	an	intriguing	further	
implication	about	the	possibility	that	if	elephants	(or	other	hypersocial	intelligent	
species)	turn	out	to	have	language,	the	kind	of	consciousness	they	then	likely	have	
potentially	provides	them	with	leverage	for	assisted	personhood	in	the	near	future.	
To	set	up	this	point,	consider	what	we	might	expect	to	find	if	we	could	study	a	
population	of	humans	who	had	achieved	stable	and	relatively	complex	social	
coordination	but	who	lacked	recourse	to	any	constructed	historical	record	of	their	
own	collective	learning	about	the	relative	values	of	alternative	normative	
frameworks.	All	we	are	here	imagining	are	aspects	of	the	social	life	of	our	own	
hominid	and	human	ancestors	to	which	we	have	lost	observational	access.	Then	we	
might	reflect	as	follows.	Even	scientists	who	most	stringently	emphasise	
discontinuities	between	cognitive	capacities	of	modern	humans	and	living	non-
humans	(e.g.	Penn	et	al	2008)	do	not	argue	that	innate	or	even	strictly	internal	
cognitive	mechanisms	make	all	aspects	of	the	discontinuity	unbridgeable	under	all	
conceivable	ontogenetic	learning	contingencies.	The	considerations	canvassed	
above	might	lead	us	to	conclude	that	the	most	interesting	question	isn’t	whether	
elephants	or	other	hypersocial	intelligent	animals	are,	now,	as	it	were,	‘secretly’,	
persons.	A	better	question	might	rather	be:	could	circumstances	be	contrived	that	
would	allow	an	elephant,	with	current	elephant	neural	kit,	to	come	to	normatively	
govern	itself	by	reference	to	a	story,	or	even	a	bit	of	simple	moral	philosophy?	
There	is	no	persuasive	basis	for	denying	that	Pepperberg	enjoyed	genuine	
conversational	exchanges,	in	English,	with	the	parrot	Alex.	The	burden	of	argument	
would	surely	lie	with	anyone	who	suggested	doubt	that	this	changed	the	character	
of	Alex’s	conscious	experience.	Suppose,	then,	that	a	day	comes	when,	thanks	to	
exploiting	deep	learning	algorithms	for	generating	translational	code	for	a	non-
human	language,	we	enter	into	conversation	with	elephants	or	crows	or	parrots	or	
orcas	in	the	terms	of	their	own	frames	of	reference.	Why	might	not	some	of	the	
social	scaffolding	humans	have	built	thereby	become	available	to	them?	Might	this	
not	suddenly	and	dramatically	lever	them	up	the	ladder	toward	FHSC	and	personal	
selfhood?	(Might	we	be	able	to	explain	to	elephants	that	their	species	was	driven	to	
the	brink	of	extinction	because	some	humans	wanted	to	make	trinkets	out	of	their	
tusks?	Could	they	be	made	militantly	furious,	or	depressed,	at	receipt	of	this	awful	
news?)	Accounts	of	human	mind	and	consciousness	based	on	niche	construction,	
with	their	emphasis	on	external	props	for	FHSC	and	personhood,	clarify	the	extent	
to	which	the	inboard	requirements	might	not	be	as	formidable	as	most	philosophers	
have	thought.	Start	with	enough	sub-cognitive	complexity	to	be	worth	unifying,	
enough	social	structure	and	social	variation	to	allow	for	evolution	of	the	neural	
processing	basis	(Graziano’s	or	some	other),	the	bare	capacity	to	symbolically	
represent	symbols,	and	assisted	FHSC	and	personhood	might	be	achievable.	
Enormous	though	the	actual	difference	between	actual	human	and	elephant	
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consciousness	might	be,	it	might	mainly	hinge	on	context.	This	context	may	soon	lie	
within	our	power	to	change.	
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